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Lifting government controls on sugar prices and production
would probably  increase world sugar prices. World prices would
definitely be less volatile, and th^ end of intervention would
certainly improve  world  welfare,especiallv  in the sugar-exporting
developing countries.
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The world sugar market has long been character-  Because so many domestic markets are
ized by volatile prices and widespread interven-  insulated, the burden of adjustment is bome by
tion.  the relatively small unprotected exporting
countries (such as Thailand).  Moreover, to
Controls on domestic prices, demand, and  induce needed adjustments in supply and de-
supply have created an inefficient pattem of  mand, the world price must vary more than is
world production, consumption, and trade.  otherwise necessary.
Without govemment controls, production would
shift from the subsidized, higher-cost countries  Borrell and Duncan survey estimates of the
(especially Japan, the European Community, and  economic costs of various forms of government
the United States) to the lower-cost countries  assistance to sugar industries.
(such as Australia, Brazil, and Thailand).
The impact of policies in the high-cost
The resources saved could be directed to  countries (Japan, the EC, and the United States)
other activities, and with lower sugar prices,  is to reduce world sugar prices in the long run
consumers would have more money to spend on  (perhaps by more than 30%), to increase price
other goods and services.  variability by as much as 28%, and to increase
the probability of very low prices.  The impact of
Borrell and Duncan describe how govern-  production controls in Australia and Brazil is to
ment support of sugar producers exacerbates the  increase world prices and the instability of world
volatility of sugar prices.  Govemment-con-  prices.
trolled increases in production have come only
after price peaks (as in 1963, 1974, and 1980).  What would happen if all interventions
The resulting surges in production far exceeded  ceased? It cannot be concluded unambiguously
steady growth in consumption.  that av'- age world sugar prices would increase,
but thcy probably would.  World prices would
Production increases greatly when world  definitely vary less, and world welfare would
prices are high but does not contract greatly  definitely improve, especially in developing
when they are low.  When world prices fall  countries that depend hcavily on sugar exports.
because of a surge in production, protective
policies are activated to support the expanded
industries, causing world prices to remain
depressed for several years.
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1.  INTRODUCTION
Volatility in world agricultural commodity markets has long given rise to forces which compel
farmers to form coalitions and to demand political action to address problems caused by price
instability  and  risk.  The incentives for  consumer groups  (and perhaps  taxpayers)  to respond
politically to volatile prices are different from those of farmers. The uneven political pressures from
different groups gives rise to policy interventions which consistently favor  one group over another,
usually farmer groups.
Volatile prices and widespread govemment intervention have long been features of the world sugar
market. Prices appear to follow a pattem of short, sharp peaks and extended price troughs. Indeed
sugar is one of the most volatile of all primary commodity markets.
To  gain some independence from the volatile world market, producers in most countries have
lobbied their govemments  to operate schemes aimed at controlling domestic prices, supply and
demand. Numerous price, production, trade and stock-holding policies have been devised.
Ultimately, this insulation from the market has greatly distorted production, consumption, trade and
world price.Under a more liberal trading order, production would tend to shift from subsidised,
higher-cost countries (such as the United States, the European Community and Japan) to lower-cost
countries (such as Thailand,Brazil, Australia and other efficient exporting countries). The world's
sugar requirements would therefore be produced with less resources. The resources saved could be
used in other industries to generate additional income. Consumers currently paying high domestic
prices would be able to buy more agricultural and other goods and thus have higher real incomes.
The  Uruguav  round  of  the GATT  multilateral  trade  negotiations  has opened  an  avenue  for
agricultural trade liberalization. Many special interest groups, however, stand in the way of trade
reformns.  Long-lasting and effcctive reforms will not be achieved easily. To achieve durable reforms,
measures must be adopted that alter  the incentives which affect the policy formation  process.
Understanding the policy formation processes which spawn and sustain interventionist trade policies
in particular markets will help in assessing the long-term effectiveness of various options for trade
reforms.
To provide a framework for assessing the prospects for trade reform in the sugar market, the paper
begins by explaining the main features of the policy formation processes affecting the sugar market.
The  discussion draws heavily on a recent model of the world market developed by Wong, Sturgiss
and Borrell (1989), and indeed some parts of this paper summarize that work directly. Some of the
key features of existing policies are discussed and the findings of a number of empirical studies are
highlighted to draw attention to the economic costs and welfare effects of such policies. The paper
concludes with our best bet assessment of the prospects for reform
2.  THE  WORLD  SUGAR  MARKET
The volatility of world sugar prices is shown in figure A. In June 1985 the (nominal) world market
price slumped to an historical low of US2.8c/lb. A decade earlier, in the boom year of 1974, sugar
had sold for a brief period at around US120c/lb (in 1985 values) and averaged US59c/lb for the
year. The average  real price  over the past 35 years  (again, in  1985 values)  has been around
US 16c/lb, and the average cost of production (worldwide) is estimated at around US20c/lb. Because
of the volatility of the world market, virtually all countries - even those exporting nations with low
production costs - have attempted in some way to modify their domestic markets so as to insulate
their producers from low prices. This protection has both compensated for, and sustained, the long
term excess of costs over export returns.2
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Among  the producing  countries,  those  most exposed  to world  price volatility  are those  that export a
large share  of production,  such as Thailand  and Australia.  Cuba, although  a large exporter.  has its
exposure  reduced  through  a bilateral  trade  deal with  the Soviet  Union.  The producers  which  are least
exposed are those with large domestic markets. In these countries consumers and taxpayers
subsidise  producers  and insulate  them  from the world  price fluctuations.  The most notable  examples
in this category  are the United  States,  the European  Community,  Japan,  the USSR,  'ndia and China.
The sugar policies  of major  developed  countries  have  attracted  much attention  by the magnitude  of
support  they offer to producers  and their seeming  disregard  for the high costs incurred.  The stated
aims  of sugar  policy  in developed  countries  are usually  stability  and maintenance  of farm  incomes,  in
the face of volatile prices, and industry expansion. In some cases self-sufficiency  has been a
consideration,  as in Europe and Japan. Intervention  is also widespread  in developing  countries,
where  a primary  aim of policy  is to earn  or conserve  foreigr.  exchange.  In high price  years,  sugar is
a valuable foreign exchange earner for exporting nations but a severe drain on reserves for
importers.
In their attempts to achieve these stated aims, governments  use controls on supply - that is, on
domestic  production  and zrade  - and/or  operate  a stocking  policy.  Thus all industry  variables  come
under  government  control  or influence.
In figure B the producer prices in Japan, the United States and the European Community are
presented,  together  with world  prices, in nominal  terms.  It can be seen that support  to producers  in
these  countries  is very high: in Japan  the producer  price  in 1986  was eleven  times the world price.
As well as providing support, these domestic prices provide a degree of stability - in all cases
producers are protected in times of falling world prices. The United States is notable for its
insulation  of producers  fromn  world price troughs  but not from the peaks;  it a-pears that support  of
producers'  incomes  is a nigher  priority  than any benefits  from price stability.
Protection  against  low producer  prices can also be achieved  by placing  restrictions  on r-oJuction.
figure  C shows  three such  controls:  the A quota  in the European  Community,  and land  as  nents
and mill peaks  in Australia.  (These  are all, in essence,  limits  on the quantities  of sugar that.  .eive a
supported  price).  Controlled  expansions  of the industry  occur,  but  contractions  do not, even  in times
of very low prices.
Government  policies,  designed  in part to protect  producers  from  instability  in world  prices,  have
tended  to exacerbate  world  price  fluctuations,  because  increases  in supply  have  not  been  well
synchronised  with the rather stable  growth  in demandl.  Governments  change  production  controls
only after long  intervals  (as in figure  C), and  then in large steps.  The government  controlled
increases  in production  have  come  only after world  price  peaks.  The resulting  surges  in production
worldwide  can far exceed  increases  in consumption  (see  figures  A and  E).
Though  high world prices  have  led to large  increases  in production,  low  world  prices  have not led to
large contractions.  When world prices fall due to a surge in production,  protective policies are
activated to support the expanded industries  and new fixed investments  around the world.  This
protection  of expanded  production  causes  world prices to remain  depressed  for some  years.  After a
time,  consumption  again exceeds  production,  and stocks  fall to a level  where  a large weather  induced
drop in production  can again lead to a sharp increase  in world price. Price booms  and slumps  have
therefore  been  a major  feature  of the market
I  For  instance, t'hie  World Bank has  financed large expansions of  production following the
peaks of  1975 and  1980-81 (see figure D). In each case the peak in  World Bank investments
came two years after the  woirld  price peak, and at  the  same time  that production increases
arising  from  changes  in  {  -.ment  policies  reached the  world  market.ft  4
rBecause  of the insulation of many domestic markets by the-r governments, the burden of adjustment
is  borne  '-y the relatively  small unprotected  sectors  of the market.  To  induce  the necessary
adjustmeli,s of supply  and demand,  the world price must vary more than would otherwise  be
required.
. Economic  Effects  of  Policy  Intervention
Under a trading system in which policy interventions were reduced, so that producers had incentives
to respond directly to the world price, producers would be likely to base their production plans on
anticipated growth in consumption and on changing market conditions. Severe shortages of sugar
and  high  prices would  then be less  likely  to occur, as would overexpansion  and periods  of
drastically low prices; the price would become less variable.
Whether the average world price iev '1 over time would be higher or lower than otherwise is difficult
to predict. It is possible that the average world price would increase because of the reduced tendency
for higher-cost producers to expand under the stimulus of high support prices. On the other hand,
with the removal of supply controls in the lower-cost countries it might be profitable for efficient
producers to supply the world market at a price lower than would otherwise prevail.
What is more certain is that there would be a shift in production away from subsidised, higher-cost
countries to lower-cost countries. The welfare of producers in efficient exporting countries would be
lifted through greater trade opportunities. The welfare of consumers and taxpayers in importing
countries would also be increased because the world's sugar  would ultimately  be produced with
less resources. Prices paid by consumers would be lowered overall and subsidiks paid by taxpayers
would be reduced or eliminated.
. The  Policy  Formation  Process
Intervention in the world sugar marAcet  began over 300 yeqrs ago, when European countries stric.ly
regulated the trade in sugar to facilitate taxation of their sugar producing colonies (Ballinger 1971).
The colonies  were forced to export exclusively to the respective mother countries  (or to their
colonies) where large import duties were exacted. These duties, by increasing the landed price of
sugar, indirectly provided an incentive for the establishment of sugar production (especially from
beet) in Europe and North America. These sugar industries therefore grew up heavily dependent on
the import taxes, and thus with a strong interest in this intervention being maintained.
a.Vested interests
With few exceptions, groups whose welfare is directly affected by government intervention seek to
influence  policies  in a way which  favors them. In the higher-cost countries,  producer  groups
influence  sugar  policies  in  a  fashion  which  consistently  favors  producers  at  the expense  of
consumers,  taxpayers  and  producers  in  other countries.  In Japan,  the Unit,i  States and  the
European Community, for example, subsidies have in recent years made up more than half the
income of a sugar farmer or sweetener producer. These costs, unless they are budget items, are not
usually transparent to consumers, taxpayers or voters.
The amount firms or individuals stand to gain from policy interventions  will determine their incentive
to  form 'distributional coalitions' (Olsen  1982) to lobby to maintain or increase the protection.
Those  who incur the costs of the support policies  - consumers and  taxpayers who fund such
subsidies, and other groups such as producers of other goods who incur less obvious economic
costs  - have,  as groups,  strong incentives  to press for  reforms.  However,  as inc(ividuals, the
incentives to press for reform are small because the cost of the policies to individuals (even when
clearly perceived), tends to be small. As well, the costs of forming a strong lobby group out of a
diverse and numerous group such as sugar consumers are usually quite large in comparison to the
benefits to be obtained from policy reforn.5
Producers,  however,  may have very large incentives  to form coalitions.  Relatively  small  producer
groups,  who I.,ve  a great deal of fixed capital  in the sweetener  industry,  have strong  incentives  to
lobby  to mairtain support.  For instance,  in the United  States,  the six large  companies  which  own  all
the mills and farms in Florida received total support  estimated  at US$329m  in 1984-85  (in 1984
dollar values), (Borrell,  Sturgiss  and Wong 1987).  In the same  year the estimated  cost of the sugar
policy  to a US family  of four was about  US$55.  Thus, the political  will to reform  is not strong,  even
where the benefits of an existing policy are enjoyed by relatively few and the costs exceed the
benefits  and are borne  by many.
b. Volatility  of prices
The variability  of world market prices may help producer groups  to achieve regulatory  changes
which ultimately increase the totai level of support they receive. When the woild price rises,
producers seek political support for increases in either production quotas, producer prices or
subsidised investment - since production controls and fixed domestic prices may clearly
disadvantage  even some  high-cost  producers  when  world  price is high.  At the same  time,  if security
of supply  or maintenance  of foreign  reserves  are government  objectives,  high prices in the world
market may provide an additional stimulus  for governments  to encourage  expansion  of domestic
production  - even  if it is not profitable  for the economy  as a whole.
When  prices  fall due to a surge  in production,  producers  have a strong  incentive  to seek protection  of
the value of their fixed investments. Particularly  for a government  which has encouraged  the
previous  expansion,  it can be politically  difficult  to reduce  protection,  despite  its rising  financial  and
economic  costs. H-1igh  levels of protection  are thus given to enlarged  industries, lengthening  the
period of excessive  production  and depressed  prices. Indeed,  the expectation  of protection  against
low prices may have  encouraged  producers  to over-expand  when given  the opportunity  to increase
production.
It is usually only after a long period of depressed prices, if at all, that some action is taken to
decrease levels of support. When world prices fall the costs of export rebates and stockholding
increase, as has happened in recent :  s in the European Community.  Further, the cost to
consumers  increases.  (In Japan, for exam.pie,  though  the recent high value of the yen has lowered
the world price of imported  goods,  the lower prices  for agricultural  products  have not been passed
on to consumers;  however, some  pressure  is now being mounted  for this to be done (see ABARE
1988)).  In each case, pressure is applied through  the political  system to change the level of some
intervention (such as domestic price or production controls). Changes are likely to be small,
however,  and to occur only slowly.
Thus the high degree of price volatility in the world market tends to help producers in many
countries  to lobby  for changes  in policy  which  ultimately  lead to increases  in the supported  output  of
their industries  even when  prices are low. Paradoxically,  such  behaviour  exacerbates  world market
instability.  Through  a shift to freer  trade  world prices  may  become  more  stabilised,  thereby  reducing
the incentives  for producers  to lobby  for increases  in intervention.  A shift to freer trade would  also
result in better  resource allocation.Thus,  intervention  is both a cause and an effect of instability  in
world prices. It is also a cause of sustained  resource  misallocation  in the production  of sugar and
other sweeteners  worldwide.
3.  EMPIRICAL  EVIDENCE  OF THE EFFECTS  OF INTERVENTION
Protectionist  agricultural  policies  have so distorted  world markets that it is difficult to determine
accurately  what  form these  markets  might assume  under  more liberal  trading  practices.  Nonetheless,
some studies  analysing  the separate  effects  of specific  country  policies  have been undertaken,  and
others have been conducted  which look at the joint effects of policies  of several countries.  Such
studies  provide  important  insights  about the impacts  of intervention  and the effectiveness  of policy
reform.6
Separate  Effects:  OECD  Countries
Since  1975, EC,  US  and Japanese policies  have encouraged  sweetener  productioll which has
contributed to  the structural  surpluses of sugar and periods of severe low prices on the world
market. Dliring this time the European Community has risen from the status of a r-  'nporter to
second largest exporter. The United States has declined from the largest importer, acco,..Lung  for 20
per cent of world imports or 5.5 million tons to around 1 million tons (3.5 per cent). Japan, now the
second largest importer, has experienced a 25 per cent reduction in imports.
Both the United States and the Europeani  Community offer some form of compensation to exporters
for lowering the world price. Compensation is granted by allowing exporters restricted access to the
high priced US and EC markets.  Import quotas are used to restrict access and the rents  which
exporters can appropriate from these markets. In the European Community the quotas have been
virtually fixed since 1975. In the United States rer.ts received by quota holdors have been declining
in line with declining imports
Apart from lowering the world price, US, EC and Japanese policies also increase instability in the
world price. To equilibrate demand and supply, larger price adjustments are required in the world
market than otherwise would be necessary. The lower and less stable prices directly cause resource
allocation distortions and reduced welfare in third countries. Also, by indirectly `nducing  changes in policies  in other counties,  for example, to protect producers'  incomes, rf source allocation  and
welfare can be indirectly affected. Import quota rents, such as those given by ;;.e United States to the
Caribbean  Basin Countries, are another cause of resource allocation distortions and changes in
welfare in and between third countries. Selective allocation of quotas can protect high-cost producers
like Dominican Republic and Jamaica from low cost producers  like Zimbabwe, Swaziland and
Thailand. Moreover, quota rents can be capitalized into factor prices, raising costs of producdon and
decreasing the long-term international competitiveness  of countries heavily protected by quotas.
a. United States
Sugar consumption and imports have declined in the United States due to the technical developments
in, and price competitiveness of, alternative sweeteners. These alternatives include high fructose
corn syrup and low-caloric sweeteners such as aspartame. The high and stable US price resulting
from protection, has been a major factor contributing  to the declining trend in sugar consumption and
imports. Sugar's share of the total US sweetener market fell from 79 per cent in 1970 to 41 per cent
by 1988.
The major feature of US sweetener policy has been the level of protection it has offered not only to
sugar producers  but  also  to producers  of high  fructose corn  syrup (see  figure B).  The chief
instruments of the policy are the target domestic price (termed the market stabilisation price) and the
import  controls which  support  it. The import quota  is determined  on the basis  of the chosen
stabilisation price level and likely US supply vad demand conditions. When the world price rises
above the stabilisation price, import quotas are niot  set and domestic prices follow the world price up.
Domestic  sugar production  is  based on  both beets and  cane. Domestic  sugar  production  har
increased rapidly in recent years to 6.7 Mt in 1967-88 from just under 5.5 Mt in  1985--86. This
increase  has been caused largely by beet growers switching production from wheat to beets in
response to declining relative returns from wheat. The size of the increase indicates an increase in
responsiveness of some beet growers to changes in relative prices of wheat and beet since the 1980
Farm Bill. This increased sensitivity can be explained as a response to the change in sugar price
policy. In the 1980s sugar prices I ive been more stable than previously and have been announced
up to 4 years beforehand. Uncertainty regarding sugar returns has therefore been removed which has
changed the relative attractiveness of beets and wheat production.
Corn syrup has many of the attributes of sugar and is readily substitutable for it in many uses (for
example, soft drinks). In the United States its costs of production are low relative to protected sugar7
price enabling  its producers  to undercut  the sugar  price  and rapidly  expand  their  market share  of the
calornc  sweetener  market.  Comn  syrup production  has been allowed  to grow uncontrolled  (unlike  in
the European Community,  where it is limited by very small production  quotas). By 1985, high
fructose corn syrup had virtually completed its subsLitution  for sugar in applications where
substitution  was relatively  easy. Henceforth  high fructose  corn syrup is expected to maintain  its
share  of the  caloric  sweetener  market.
Reduced  US import  demand for sugar is estimated  to have greatly  depressed  world sugar prices in
the 1980s. Sudaryanto  (1987)  estitmated  that in 1982-83  US sugar policies  depressed the world
price by 49 per cent. Borrell,  Sturgiss  and Wong (1987)  estimated  a depressing  effect of 34 to 50
per cent for the period 1982 to 1986. More recently, Sturgiss, Field and Young (1990) have
estimated  sugar policy  to have depressed  the price on average  by between  21 and 33 per cent over
the period 1982  to 1988,  although  for some years  reductions  of up to 48 per cent were estimated.
Moreover, Sturgiss, Field and Young (1990) estimated that US grains pricing arrangements
depressed  the world sugar  price a further  9 per cent  over the period 1986  to 1988.
The work  of Borrell,  Sturgiss  and Wong  (1987)  and Sturgiss,  Field  and Young  (1990)  suggests  that
the impact  of US policy  is particularly  severe  dur.ng the depressed  phase  of the world price cycle,
because it is then that the gap between  US and world prices  is greatest.  Borrell,  Sturgiss  and Wong
(1987)  estimate US policy increases  world price instability  by between 8 and 12.5  per cent. The
policy  increases  the chance  of both very low  and very high prices. Nonetheless,  averaged  out over
the long term (a 20 year period)  the depressing  effect  of US policy,  although  not as severe as has
been  the case during the 1980s,  is sizable.  Borrell,  Sturgiss  and Wong  (1987)  estimate a reduction
of 9 per  cent on average.
There are at least two measons  why the impact of US policy has been so large. First is that the
increases  in domestic production  of both high fructose  corn syrup and sugar in the United States
displaced an estimated 68 to 82 percent of imported sugar by 1988 (Sturgiss,  Field and Young
1990).  Second,  is that consumers  and  producers  elsewhere  in the world are mostly  unresponsive  to
changes in world price. Because  declines in the world price cause, at best, small changes in tne
quantities  of sugar supplied  and demanded,  relatively  large  falls  in world  price are  required  to induce
absorption  of the imports  displaced  from the United  States.  With so little adjustment  in production
and  consumption,  falling  prices  mostly  induce  increased  stock  holding.
Although US policy provides some  compensation  to exporters  due to the lower world price, for
most exporting  countries  the policy  now imposes  net  costs. The main  beneficiaries  of the policy  are
Japan, the Soviet Uni  e l and China.  In table 1, a summary  of the estirmiated  costs and/or  benefits  of
the policy  on exportc  s for select  years  is given.
For Australia,  Brazil, he European  Community,  Fiji and Thailand,  US policy imposed  hefty costs,
at least between 1982  and 1988. Access  to the high-priced  US market was insufficient  to provide
compensation for the loss of export  revenue from the world market  - no compensation  is given  to
the European  Community.
For the Caribbean  Basin countries, access  to the high-priced  US market  is considered  to be a form
of aid under the United State's Caribbean  Basin Initiative. However, although the benefit was
sizable in the early eighties,  in line with the declining  import  quota  it has since declined  and  indeed,
in 1988 at least, is estimated  to have  imposed  a net cost on the regior. Moreover,  considering  that
the estimates  given  exclude  the economic  effects  associated  with  resource  misallocations  arising  from
distortions  to trade, the costs are likely  to be greater  than  reported.  Areas which once produced
sugar for the US market have  been fo;ced out of sugar production,  having  been unable  to compete
on the depr-essed  world market. Sturgiss, Field and Young (1990) report that exports from the
region decreased  by 0.6Mt between 1983  and 1988,  corresponding  to a loss of revenue  of $340m.
Based  on this consideration  the costs  of US policies  on the region may  have  outweighed  the benefits
by as early as 1986.8
The Philippines and Argentina may similarly be suffering net costs from the policy when
consideration of the wider economic effects is made. Like the Caribbean  Basin c3untries, the
Philippines  has reduced both total exports and exports to the un irotected  world market over the
eighties.  It was highly  dependant  on access  to the high-priced  US miarket  in the early eighties.  With
the reduction  of access to the US market  the Philippines  has found  itself uncompetitive  on the world
market. By contrast, Thailand,  Fiji, Swaziland,  Zimbabwe  and Malawi  are developing  countries
which were only given  very limited  access to the US market.  Highly dependant  on the free world
market  , these  countries  had to rem,.-n  highly  competitive  to export.  Despite  depressed  world prices
these  countries  increased  exports  during  the eighties.
L1Income  transfers  to trading  partners  resulting  from US sugar  policies  - in 1988  values  US$m
Country  or region  1982  1984  1986  1988
a  b  a  b  a  b  a  b
Argentina  42  21  15  8  7  2
Australia  -7  -34  -76 -194  -78  -244  -227 -526
Brazil  20  -3  -16 -134  -12  -151  -206 -511
Caribbean  Basin  198  111  200  132  -5 -110
Countries
Dominican  Republic  120  84  87  60  5  -40
European  -34  -62  -167 -320  -153 -383  -409 -961
Community
Fiji  2  -4  -4  -8  -20  -48
Philippines  83  48  69  56  39  39
Thailand  -54  -110  -79  -193  -177 -390
Source Sturgiss, Field and Young (1990) , a) lower bound, b) upper bound.
WVhen  foreign  competition  is reduced  (as occurred  in those  exporting  countries  with large quotas),
domestic  industries  tend  to become  uncompetitive  and resist  the changes  adopted  in other countries
(Kindleberger,  1973).  Fry (1982)  has argued  that restrcted access to protected  sugar markets such
as the United  States, has caused  producers  such as those  in the Caribbean  to change  from being low
cost to high cost producers. Provision of rents from a market creates a need for government
intervention  of some  kind in the recipient  countries  to control  the  distributions  of those  rents.  When
rents are distributed via the pricing mechanism economic  distortions will be introduced to an
industry.  Through  time,  the intervention  and the distortions  it creates, can have  costly, unintended
side effects.  Fry argues that  in countries  such as the Dominican  Republic  and the Philippines,  high
returns have caused factor prices - such as labour and fertiliser  - to be bid up and inefficient
growing  and  milling  practices  have  developed.
Ives and Hurley (1988) '--vide  detailed analysis of the effects of the US sugar program on tne
Caribbean  Basin  countri_ and the Philippines.  They ce-clude that the program  has imposed  great
hardship  on Caribbean  countries  and the Philippines  especially.  Unemployment  has soared  in many
regions,  and in the Caribbean  where  sugar is the regions  largest  employer,  the US sugar program  is
a major  cause  of this problem.
Although  the costs imposed  on exporting  countries  have been very large, losses to the rest of the
world  in total are estimated  to be less than  the cost  the policy  imposes  on the US economy.  Estimates
of the income transfers and costs which the policy imposes  on US groups are given in table 2.
Between  1982  and 1988,  the costs to US consumers  and stock holders  exceeded  the transfers  to US
sugar and  high fructose  com syrup  manufacturers  by an estimated  $776m  to $778m.  During  its most
expensive  period, the policy imposed  costs on the US economy  in excess of $lb annually  --  the
cost varies  with changes  in the world  price.9
The subsidy equivalent afforded sugar producers and high fructose corn syrup producers is
estimated to be in the order of $lb each per year between 1982 and 1988. The esiimated costs
imposed  on consumers  over the same  period  are in the order  of $ 2.5b annually.  Costs  and transfers
of a similar  order of magnitude  have  been  estimated  in several  other studies  on US sugar  policy  (for
a review  of estimates  from partial  equilibrium  stildies  on the US sugar  program,  see Rendleman  and
Hertel 1989).
2 Income  transfers  and costs to US groups  resulting  from US suga-  policies. In 1988  values
Crop year  b  Lower  Upper  Lower  Upper  Lower  Upper
US$m  US$m  US$m  US$m  US$m  US$m
Transfer  to  Transfer  to  Cost  to
US sugar  producers  US HFCS  producers  US consumers
1982-85  1 304  1 164  1 035  739  3 362  2 959
1986  1  502  1 299  1 645  1  014  4 197  3 506
1987  1 124  716  1 237  548  3 042  1 853
1988  1 919  558  1044  394  2538  1 327
1982-88  1 108  904  1008  614  2903  2315
Transfer  to  Cost .o US  Net loss to
govemment  stockholders  US economy
1982-85  95  95  57  42  986  1 003
1986  9  9  13  48  1 054  1 232
1987  8  8  43  50  716  632
1988  6  6  30  34  500  404
1982-88  51  51  45  43  776  785
a Transfer  may not cancel  due to rounding.  b September-August.
Source:  Sturgiss,  Field and Yomug  (1990).
The losses to the US economy arise from efficiency  losses and the income transfered from US
consumers  to foreign  suppliers  of sugar  (quota  holders).  US sugar  policy  encourages  industry  to use
resources in the production of sweeteners at a cost higher than the international  value of such
products, and on imports the US economy  pays nuoie  for its sweeteners  than their international
value.  Because of the benefits  US policy  confers to some  countries,  such as cheaper  sugar imports
for the Soviet  Union,  Japan  and China,  the net losses  to the world  economy  are less  than  those  to the
US economy  itself. For the period 1982-88,  the loss to the world economy  is estimated  tc have
averaged  between  $300m  and $500m (Sturgiss  Field and Young,  1990).  Sturgiss,  Field and Young
(1990)  make a number  of qualifications  about  their  estimates,  arguing  they have  erred  on the side of
conservatism  - there are many reasons for believing  they have underestimated  the costs of US
policy.  Largely  this is because  they  have  not taken  into account  the impact  of the policy  on all other
sectors  of the economy.  In a study by Rendleman  and Hertel (1989),  which  looks at the effects of
the program  on 17 producing  sectors,  it is concluded  that the gains to the US economy  could  be as
much  as double  the estimates  of most other  studies.
b. The  European  Community
It is the support provided to the EC beet sugar industry  under the Common  Agricultural  Policy
which  has transfonned  the Community  from a net importer  in the early 1970s  into a large exporter.1 0
In 1983 net exports amounted to 4 Mt. Domestic prices are maintained at levels well above the world
nrice. The amount of production receiving this price is limited by quotas, and imports are subject to a
system of variable levies which effectively excludes all imports except those that enter under the
Lome Agreement -which allows select African, Caribbean and Pacific Island countries access to the
high priced EC market for around 1.4Mt  of raw sugar annually.
The intervention price serves as a floor price, since intervention agencies are required to purchase
any  sugar (up to  the quota  amount) offered  to them  at this  price.  In  1988-89 this  price  was
0.54ECU/kg  for refined and 0.45ECU/kg  for raw sugar (while the world raw sugar price was
around 0.22 ECU/kg, cif Rotterdam). In fact, producers do not usually receive the full intervention
price, because their receipts are levied to help finance the losses incurred by the Community on
exports when (as is generallv the case) the world price is lower than the supported domestic price at
which traders must buy. (The Community pays an export 'restitution' to the trader to cover the
difference.)
There are three categories of sugar: A, B and C, of which the first two are limited by quota and
receive supported prices, while the third is dnlimited and must be sold at the world price. In any year
when restrictions are made, a 'co-responsibility' levy of 2 per cent is placed on both A and B sugar.
If the funds from the co-responsibility levy do not cover the cost of restitutions, an additional levy of
either 30 per cent or 37.5 per cent is applied on B quota sugar only. On occasions when this levy is
still not enough, a further levy of 5 per cent has been imposed on A sugar and the total levy on B
sugar has been raised to around 50 per cent. However, even under these conditions the effective B
quotm  price exceeds the world price by half of the difference between the intervention price and the
world price.
Thus, A quota sugar receives near to the full intervention price. The bulk of sugar produced is A
quota sugar: in 1988-89, for the nine-member Community, it was 9.2 Mt (refined). The intervention
price is high enough relative to costs to ensure that all A quotas are filled except where weather or
disease odtbreaks make it impossible. The B quota is much smaller; in 1988-89 it was set at 2.2 Mt.
The beet producer price is also regulated, a 'minimum' price being set on the basis of the sugar
intervention price. In fact, this 'intervention beet price' is reduced in proportion to the levies paid by
the sugar producers. This reduction is significant for beets used in B quota production.
Although C sugar production must be sold on the world market without any government support,
the support provided to A and B quota production can indirectly assist producers of C sugar. In
some countries, the A, B and C returns are pooled (BAE 1985), which can have the effect that
producers receive over dhe  world price for an unlimited quantity. Even in countries where this does
not occur, the assistance given to the production of A and B quota sugar covers the fixed costs of
production, so that it is worLhwhile  to produce additional (C) sugar whenever the world price covers
the marginal costs. Furthermore, in some cases C sugar may be produced only to ensure sufficient
sugar is produced to meet a grower's A and B quota obligations, and not because it is economical by
itself.
Quotas are allocated to individual countries and then to individual factories, and are non-transferable.
Thus, shortfalls in quota production cannot be met by other factories or countries and it is possible
for  the Community  as a whole  to have B quota sugar without having  a full  A quota, due  to
production difficulties in particular localities.
To protect the market from imports, a threshold price is established which determines levies on
imports. It is based on a target price, which in 1988-89 was 0.57ECU/kg for raw and 0.66ECU/kg
for refined sugar. When the world price is lower than the threshold price imports are subject to a
levy equal to the difference between the world and threshold prices. The levy removes the incentive
to import sugar. Conversely, import subsidies and export taxes (additional to the levies described
above) are used when the world price is higher than the threshold price. The effect of this is to11
ensure stable prices in the domestic  market.  Actual imports,  as already mentioned,  are limited to
those  entering  under  the Lome  Agreement.
In essence  the effects  of EC policy  are to exclude  free entry  of imports,  to raise domestic  producer
and consumer  prices above the world price, to raise production,  lower  consumption  and increase
exports. Overall, the policy greatly adds to the structural  surpluses  which  regularly overhang  the
world market
3 European  Commnunity  support  and world prices  for sugar
World  price  a  Intervention  Percentage  of
Year  (cif  Rotterdam)  price a  world  price
ECU/l00 kg  ECU/100  kg  %
1968-69  5.81  21.23  365
1969-70  6.99  21.23  304
1970-71  9.78  21.23  217
1971-72  14.95  22.61  151
1972-73  19.50  23.34  120
1974-75  62.79  26.17  42
1975-76  29.68  30.45  103
1976-77  20.05  33.14  165
1977-78  14.08  32.83  233
1978-79  16.07  40.49  252
1979-80  33.11  41.09  124
1980-81  53.94  43.27  80
1981-82  31.58  46.95  149
1982-83  25.06  51.41  205
1983-84  27.23  53.47  302
1984-85  19.87  54.18  273
1985-86  19.38  54.18  280
1986-87  16.85  54.18  322
1987-88  20.34  54.18  266
1988-89  30.13  54.18  180
a Bcause of changes in EC accounting  units, figurs  within  each series are not strictly  comparabl. Figures  in later years may
be an over-estiniate  of producer  support  levels due to the application  of producer  levies. However,  the data  on the world price
and EC  pnce for each individual  year are in the same  units and are thefore  comparable..
Sources: Commission  of the European  Communities  (various  issues).
The long-term  price depressing  effects of EC policy on the world market have been estimated  at
between 5 and 12 per cent (Tyers and Anderson, 1987;  BAE, 1985;  Koester and Schmitz, 1982).
BAE (1985)  estimates  that  production  is between 1.3 and 2.3 million  tonnes  higher  and exports 1.6
to 2.5 million  tonnes  greater than  they  otherwise  would  have been  if support  arrangements  had not
existed. However  the nature of intervention  in the EC sugar market so distorts supply it is very
difficult to accurately model how producers would respond if exposed to the world price.
Nonetheless,  because  the intervention  price is usually  several  multiples  of the world price (see table
3), it seems  reasonable  to assume  that a substantial  reduction  in supply  would  occur.
Our own work  suggests  EC polities have  the potential  to cause an even  greater  impact  on the world
market than given  above. Using the model  of Wong, Sturgiss  and Borrell  (1989),  a simulation  was
conducted  in which  it was assumed  that A and B quota production  was reduced  to a level equal to
EC consumption.  It was assumed  that C sugar  only was traded  and all export  restitution  paymerts1 2
ceased.  Subsidies  were  assumed  still to  be paid on reduced  A and  B quota  production.  The
underlying assumption is that in the absence of export restitutions current producers of A and B
quota sugar would not supply sugar to the world market - though producers of C sugar would and
may even increase supply. This assumption does not seem unreasonable considering that it was not
until after support prices were raised and A and B quotas were increased to a level well above 100
per cent self-sufficiency in 1975-76 that the European Community became a net exporter at all. Even
with  considerable  subsidies  before  1975-76, the  European  Community  was  not an  expr-r
Although  changes in  technology since  1975-76 have increased  productivity in the industry,  it
appears that the large boost in subsidies granted the industry since 1975-76 has been a major factor
sustaining the export of A and B quota sugar. BAE (1985) concludes that the support arrangements
for quota sugar enable substantial quantities of sugar to be produced in parts of the Community
where cost structures would otherwise prevent them from producing any or much sugar at all.
The results of our work indicate that the European Community's dumping of A and B quota sugar
on the world market alone has the potential to lower world price by 17.5 per cent on average over the
long term and by at least 30 per cent during the low price phases of the world price cycle. (For 1982-
83, Sudaryanto (1987) estimates EC policies in total lowered the world price by 35 per cent).
Dumping of A and B quota sugar on the world market is not the only way EC policy depresses
world price. Because EC consumer prices are also set above the world price, EC consumption is
depressed to some extent as well. The effect of this on the world price is not included in our own
measurement above, although it is in Sudaryanto's. Nonetheless, taking our estimate above as a
broad indication of the impact of EC policies on the world market, some indication of the welfare
effects on exporting countries can be made. For Australia and Brazil, the policy is estimated to have
cost up to $16Cm each, annually between 1982 and 1988 (in 1984 dollar values), for Thailand up to
$72rn, for the Philippines and South Africa up to about $50m, for the Dominican Republic $23m
and for Columbia and Guatemala around $13m each.
For the ACP countries with access to the high priced EC market under the Lome Convention, the net
effect of the policy, after allowing for the price-depressing effects on the world market is estimated
to be positive for most countries between 1982 and 1988. These benefits are summarised in table 4.
Among the larger exporters of this group, Mauritius appears to have been a clear beneficiary of the
policy between 1982 and 1988, while for Zimbabwe, Swaziland and Fiji the benefits have been
considerably less, especially when measured on a unit export basis as shown in table 5. Over 75 per
cent of Mauritian exports have access to the EC market, while it is less than 33 per cent in the case of
the other countries mentioned above. Koester and Schmitz (1982) estimated the welfare effects of
EC policy on the ACP countries for  1978-79 and also found wide disparities  in the net benefits
conferred on recipient countries. They point out that although the preferential access granted ACP
countries is regarded as a form of aid for these countries, there is no correlation between the net
benefit conferred and the GDP of those countries. They found that the welfare effects are arbitrary
and do not correspond to any obvious objective of EC development policy.
Like the estimates  made by Sturgiss, Field and Young (1990) for the effects of US policy on
Caribbean countries, the estimates given in table 4 and 5 exclude the economic effects associated
with resource misallocations arising from distortions to trade. Therefore, the benefits are likely to be
less than reported. Zimbabwe and Swaziland, in particular, increased  their exports  to the world
market during  the eighties despite  the depressed world price. If world prices had not been so
depressed by the EC policy, exports from these countries may have expanded even more quickly. If
such effects could have been factored into the calculations, the estimated net benefits would be less
than reported. Furthermore, the gross benefits are those arising during a period of very low world
prices and are therefore near their maximum. At other stages of the world price cycle the gross
benefits would be  less and even negative. Presently the gross benefits from access to the high-
priced EC market are less than between  1982 and 1988 because the world price is considerably
higher than it was then. Meanwhile, the EC policy still exerts a price-depressing effect on the world
market. The net benefits shown in table 4 should not therefore be regarded as indicators of the long-
term annualised benefit of the policy for these countries. (Estimates of future effects if the policy are
given later).1 3
4  Net benefits to ACP countries from EC sugar policy in 1984 values, US$m
1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988
Barbados  6.73  11.20  9.93  11.06  9.41  16.80  13.72
Belize  3.41  6.80  6.77  7.73  6.74  12.67  9.97
Congo  2.34  2.45  1.82  2.56  2.01  3.30  2.63
Cote d'Ivoire  -1.21  0.09  1.78  2.40  2.24  3.83  3.00
Fiji  14.88  33.58  29.38  31.14  30.35  49.29  39.02
Guyana  22.07  34.31  33.64  35.76  31.67  54.97  46.19
Jamaica  21.58  29.33  27.63  28.15  25.56  42.84  34.16
Madagascar  1.95  2.39  2.18  2.24  2.63  3.85  2.89
Malawi  0.45  2.33  2.31  1.00  2.35  4.28  3.27
Mauritius  78.56  112.43  107.23  114.75  97.98  166.30  133.64
StChristopherNevis  1.57  3.21  2.90  3.26  2.89  5.03  4.10
Swaziland  7.94  18.91  16.80  19.61  13.89  31.20  24.33
Tanzania  1.77  2.00  2.20  2.33  2.07  3.53  2.83
TrinidadandTobago  8.88  11.51  12.78  10.87  9.56  16.17  12.96
Zimbabwe  -6.10  -0.11  -0.30  1.17  -0.58  3.62  4.66
5  Net benefits to ACP countries per tonne of exports, US$ 1984
1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988
Barbados  77.37  153.41  115.48  141.75  106.95  221.08  201.81
Belize  32.82  58.63  66.41  80.56  68.76  150.88  117.26
Congo  na  272.19  82.59  512.35  154.94  194.17  154.84
Cote d'Ivoire  -19.52  1.23  77.46  239.64  448.70  3829.93  499.33
Fiji  35.86  101.45  77.31  74.32  96.36  112.79  94.24
Guyana  83.30  128.49  156.48  155.46  144.63  281.91  332.33
Jamaica  203.58  308.70  328.97  230.70  280.84  516.13  319.21
Madagascar  177.05  132.84  114.84  97.36  na  321.04  151.87
Malawi  5.78  24.78  25.91  6.98  25.24  36.86  31.43
Mauritius  124.10  174.58  190.80  200.96  "148.01  239.29  193.12
StChristopherNevis  46.08  123.31  103.63  130.56  120.52  218.87  195.10
Swaziland  23.07  50.69  42.98  51.61  27.90  71.72  60.23
Tanzania  177.05  95.24  200.45  194.19  188.32  353.23  257.33
TrinidadandTobago  355.17  575.66  -327.81  319.85  289.58  646.82  392.85
Zimbabwe  -26.62  -0.48  -1.31  5.52  -2.14  15.02  31.25
For countries such as the Dominican Republic and the Philippines the costs of the policy may be
considerably greater than estimated too. As pointed out earlier in discussing the effects of US policy,
these countries have reduced total exports over the eighties. With the loss of access to the US market
along with highly depressed world prices (due in large part to the policies of the US, EC and as will
be discussed later, Japan), these countries found themselves uncompetitive on the world market and1 4
were forced to decrease production. If higher world prices had prevailed, these countries may not
have had to decrease production and exports as much.
Although the available estimates of welfare effects of EC policy are not as comprehensive as those
calculated for the US, many of the broad effects are likely to be similar. For instance, the depressing
effects on world price  confer a benefit on importing countries, and USSR, China and Japan, as the
largest importers, are the main beneficiaries of the policy. However, overall there will be a reduction
in world welfare because the pattern of production, consumption and trade will be distorted (see
Koester and Schmitz, 1982).
c. Japan
Although Japan is the world's second largest importer of sugar, its consumption of sugar per person
is less than in any other developed nation. Moreover, it has been declining, and in recent years sugar
has lost market share to alternative sweeteners - in particular, high fructose corn syrup (see figure
21), the consumption of which has risen from virtually nil in the period before the 1974-75 world
price peak to 20 per cent of the sweetener market by 1986-87.  The decline in sugar consumption has
been accompanied by a decline in sugar imports. One of the main driving forces behind these
developments is the high consumer prices administered under Japan's sugar policy.
The key policy instrument  is a system of fixed and variable levies on imported  raw sugar. A
stabilisation agency trades in both domestically produced and imported sugar. Japanese consumer
and producer prices are both maintained well above the world price. Consumer prices are kept above
the world price,  (five times as high in 1985-86)  by subjecting imported raw sugar to high tariffs and a
complex system of variable levies, surcharges and rebates. Producer prices are kept above world
prices (raw sugar prices were eight times the world price in  1985-86) through the payment of
subsidies to growers. The high prices are intended to encourage domestic production, and are set
broadly in line with rnillers', processors' and growers' costs of production.
The very high consumer price for sugar not only reduces sugar demand directly but also allows high
fructose com syrup to be priced below sugar. Consumption of high fructose com syrup is subject to
a small tax, but maize, its major raw material, can be imported duty free. The unequal treatment of
sugar and high fructose com syrup has encouraged the production and use of the syrup in place of
sugar.
Sturgiss, Tobler and ConneUl  (1988) estimate that Japanese sugar import demand may be as much as
54 per ieni lower than it would be in the absence of govemment intervention. They also estimate that
because of Japanese sugar policy the world price is on average lower by 2-5 per cent (over the long
term), and by up to 14 per cent during the depressed phase of the world price cycle. It is also more
variable, being  11 per cent higher. In  1986 the price depressing  effects of Japanese policy are
estimated to have cost Australia between $41m to $50m (1984 dollar values); Brazil between $38
and $46m; and Thailand and the Philippines between $33m and $40m. Within Japan the policy is
estimated to have provided high fructose com syrup producers an effective subsidy of over $700m
in the three years up to 1987. Over the same period, sugar millers, processors and growers together
received an estimated subsidy of about $2000m. Meanwhile the cost to Japanese consumers over the
period was an estimated $7000m. In pointing out the sheer inefficiency of Japanese policy, Sturgiss,
Tobler and Connell (1988) indicate that for every dollar transferred to Japanese sugar producers in
1987, the cost to Japanese consumers was an estimated $2.27 and to producers elsewhere in the
world it was between $2.50 and $3.40.
Joint  Effects:  United  States,  European  Community,  Japan.
The joint effects of US, EC and Japanese policies are not simply the addition of the separate effects.
To estimate the joint effects, we ran the model of Wong, Sturgiss and Borrell (1989) assuming no
intervention in the Japanese and US sugar markets and minimal intervention only in the European
Community. EC  consumers were assumed to be exposed to world prices and A and B quota sugar1 5
production was assumed  to be restricted to current levels of consumption.  Complete  removal  of
interventionion  cannot be easily simulated  with the model  due to the seperate  modelling  of A, B and
C sugar. It was assumed  that high fructose  corn syrup consumption  grew in line with population
growth  in Japan  and the United  States.
The long-run price-depressing  effect of the policies  jointly was estimated  to be 33 per cent. The
policies were also estimated  to increase  world price variability  by 28 per cent and to increase  the
probability  of receiving  very low world prices. Under  current policies,  83 per cent of the time the
price is estimated  to be above US7.9c/lb  only (in 1984  dollar values), whereas  given the assumed
changes,  83 per cent of the time price is estimated  to be above  US 12.5c/lbs.
Effects  of  Other  Countries
Although  the interventions  of the United States,  the European  Community  and Japan have a large
depressing  effect on the world price, other large producing  and consuming  countries  may also be
depressing  the price. In particular,  the USSR,  China  and India heavily  insulate  their producers  and
consumers  from the world price, and in the case of the USSR  it also provides  considerable  support
to the Cuban  industry.  Studies  of the separate  effects  of the intervention  of these  countries,  however,
are not available.
Australia and Brazil also insulate  their producers  and consumers  from the world market to some
degree. However, the main effect of intervention in these countries appears to be to restrict
production  and exports below  their optimal  levels.  By limiting  production,  Brazilian  and Australian
intervention  may place some  upward  pressure on world price, albeit at a cost to the economies  of
both  countries.  The policies  also probably  add to instability  in the world  price.
a.  Australia
Though Australia is not a large producer of sugar by world standards,  it is one of the leading
exporters  because  its domestic  market  is small  (0.8 Mt). In 1988-89  it exported  around  2.8 Mt. The
smallness  of the Australian  domestic  market makes it impossible  to provide  high levels  of support
through  the price system.  Over the past two decades  protection  has on average  been  low or negative
(Connell  1989).  A greater  proportion  of Australian  production  is exposed  to the world price than  in
any other  country  except  possibly  Thailand.
The major instruments  of policy makers are quotas on area and production,  and the pooling of
returns  from domestic  and  export  markets.  An administratively-determined  domestic  price operated
before  July 1989,  however,  since  that time  market  forces  have  detennined  domestic  prices  - although
imported  sugar is subject  to an import  duty. All sugar produced  in Queensland  (95 per cent of the
Austalian total)  is compulsorily  acquired  by the Queensland  state  government.
Quotas  on area, known  as 'land assignments'  restrict  production.  It is not illegal  to grow  sugar cane
on unassigned  land,  but sugar produced  from such  cane is compulsorily  acquired  by the Queensland
Govemment  at $AI/t; thus,  in effect,  land  assignments  are binding.  Because  of this tight  restriction
on area, increases  in production  are limited  to what is possible  by more  intensive  use of the assigned
land.
Australia  is a very low cost producer  with a clear advantage  and considerable  potential  to produce
more sugar even at low world prices, but regulatory  provisions  allow certain small groups who
perceive  some advantage  from production  controls  to resist  calls to eliminate  them (see Borrell  and
Wong 1986). In the absence of intervention, output could expand considerably. The work of
Sturgiss, Connell and Tobler (1990) indicates  that each one per cent expansion  of supply  could
lower the world price by up to 0.2 per cent over the long term, given the existing structure  of the
world market. The cost to the Australian economy  of maintaining  its intervention  is estimated
conservatively  at A$28.4m  per year for each five per cent expansion  potential  foregone  (Sturgiss,
Connell  and  Tobler 1990).1 6
b.  Brazil
Brazil is by far the largest sugarcane producer, producing well over 200 million tonnes of cane
annually.  However, only about one third of the cane grown is used to prodiice sugar. The majority
is used to produce ethanol - a substitute automobile fuel. Brazil is already the fourth largest sugar
producer after the EC, India and the USSR. The vast quantities of cane produced potentially gives
Brazil an immense capacity to produce more sugar. If all cane were used to produce sugar, Brazilian
sugar output would rise from around 8 million tonnes annually to over 20 million tonnes. Currently,
around 105 million tonnes of sugar are produced globally each year.
A tight net of institutional controls and interventions have long been a feature of the Brazilian
industry.  They  strictly  limit the  industry's  ability  to  switch  cane between  ethanol  and sugar
production. Nonetheless the economic incentives for the Brazilian economy as a whole to divert cane
away from ethanol to sugar are great. With a border price of gasoline at around $24 per barrel ($18
Saudi crude) the shadow price of ethanol as a fuel substitute, measured in sugar equivalents, is about
4-Sc/lb only.  Compared  to  the current world  price  for sugar  of around  15c/lb, the marginal
opportunity cost of not switching is clear.
The Brazilian Government indirectly determines the structure and behaviour of the sugarcane, sugar
or ethanol industries. Annual production quotas allocated to farms, mills and distilleries regulate the
location, size and distribution of the sugarcane crop. Domestic sugarcane, sugar and ethanol prices
are fixed  and exports  are controlled. Overall, intervention  and controls isolate  producers  and
consumers  from  changes  in world  market  conditions.  Changes  in  world sugar or  fuel prices
therefore have no direct effect on the production or consumption of sugarcane or its derivatives.
Sugarcane, sugar, and ethanol prices for producers are fixed high enough relative to costs to ensure
all available  production  quotas  are filled. By world  standards,  Brazilian sugarcane  and sugar
producers are very low cost. Ethanol production is not cost competitive with imported oil prices but
ethanol prices to producers are set sufficiently high to ensure distilleries face incentives to fulfil their
quotas. Also, concessional credit is provided for investment in distilleries. Quotas. however, are the
main determninants  of production. Any switching which occurs between the production of sugar and
ethanol occurs as the direct result of changes in quotas only. The empirical evidence (see Wong,
Sturgiss and Borrell  1989) is that Brazil's capacity to switch cane between sugar and ethanol in
response to even large changes in oil and sugar prices is greatly limited under current policies.
Like Australia, Brazil is a very low cost producer with a clear advantage and considerable potential to
produce more sugar even at low world prices. In the absence of intervention, output could expand
considerably. Using the model of Wong, Sturgiss and Borrell (1989), we estimate that for each one
per cent expansion of exports from Brazil, the world price could be lowered by up to 0.3 per cent
over the long term.
Overall  Impact  of  Policy  Intervention  on  the  Sugar  Market
Because it is difficult to determine accurately how much supply might increase from countries such
as Australia and Brazil in the absence of intervention, estimates of the total effects of intervention on
the world  market  provide partial  insights  only  - but  insights  nonetheless. Most  studies  have
examined the impacts on the sugar market in a generalised, static, multicommodity framework - only
the work of Wong, Sturgiss and Borrell (1989) has specifically examined sugar using a dynamic
framework.
The Ministerial Trade Mandate model developed by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD 1987) has eleven regions and fourteen commodities. The study indicates that a
10 per cent reduction in assistance to sugar producers from 1979-81 levels would lead to a 0.93 per
cent increase in the world sugar price in those years.1 7
Webb, Roningen and Dixit (1987) use the Static World Policy Simulation model developed within
the US Department of Agriculture, with eight regions and twelve commodities. The framework of
the model is similar to that used in the OECD study. The results of the study indicate that under
complete trade liberalisation, the 1984 world sugar price would have been 53 per cent higher.
A third study done by Anderson and Tyers (1986) uses a  model in which thirty countries and seven
commodity groups are represented. Protection is measured at average 1980-82 levels. The results
indicate that under full trade liberalisation by Western European and East Asian countries, the world
sugar price (taken at its 1987 level) would have been 10 per cent higher and price variations would
have been reduced by 22 per cent. Western Europe and East Asia would have increased their net
imports by 3.5 Mt, this increase being mainly supplied from developing countries.
Another study by Zietz and Valdes (1986) analyses the effects on 56 developing countries of a
hypothetical removal of trade barriers in 17 developed countries in a multicommodity context. Their
results show that for 1983, world price would have been an estimated 13 to 30 per cent higher in the
absence of trade barriers. These results, plus results from earlier work by Valdes and Zietz (1980),
show that the estimated gains in export revenue from sugar to low and middle income developing
countries, arising as result of trade liberalisation, are very large at up to $5b in 1980 dollar values.
Moreover, they show that of gains from trade liberalisation generally, gains in sugar export revenues
for developing countries are among the greatest of all agricultural commodities.
The results of these studies are not strictly comparable. The crucial factor affecting the results is the
choice of the base period. Because world sugar prices were relatively high in the period 1979-82, the
measured levels of producer assistance in various countries are generally relatively low. The results
obtained  by OECD (1987)  and Anderson  and  Tyers  (1986) can therefore  bo, treated  as only
conservative estimates of the effects of protectionist  policies on the world price over the longer term.
Wong, Sturgiss and Borrell (1989) using their dynamic model, study the adjustments made in the
market place over time in response to policy changes. In their study a long period, 1985 to 2004, is
simulated under 60 different market scenarios. Because a long period was simulated, and under
many different scenarios, the results are not sensitive to the choice of base period. Their findings are
that significant reductions in the variability of world prices and sizable increases in the average price
could be expected even from partial (although well targeted)  multilateral trade reforms.
They found that by making a small volume of production (up to 2.5 per cent of world production) in
low-cost producing countries such as Brazil and Australia responsive to the world price, while also
charging consumers in OECD countries world prices for their sugar, sugar consumption in OECD
countries increased and the average world price was 7.6 per cent higher, than in the absence of
policy reform. The measure of variability of world prices was lower by 33 per cent. Price peaks
were lower, but prices were higher in the trough periods. The world price effects of their particular
experiment are reproduced in figure F. The 'Base' simulation shows the projected price path given a
continuation of existing policies, while 'Simulation 1' shows the price path projected assuming the
above reforms had occurred in 1985.
The lower price peaks they observed, resulted from low cost producers responding quickly and
more directly to rising world prices, and from contractions in consumptior in OECD countries in
times of high world prices. Lower price peaks reduce the incentives for high cost producers in other
countries to expand production in the years following a price peak. There was still an expansion in
production around tlhe world in response to the price peak, but it was lessened. As a result, the
consequent price  trough was less severe. Given such results the benefits to efficient exporting
countries would be sizable. For instance, Australia was estimated to benefit by as much as $294m a
year - which includes the gains to producers of receiving more stable prices.
Although the impact of policy intervention in all countries on the level of world sugar prices remains
open to some conjecture, the impact of intervention on the variability of prices seems most definitely
to have been adverse and very large. Moreover, there is little doubt that policies of the UJnited  States,1 8
the European Community and Japan have separately and jointly, greatly lowered world prices. At the
same  time  they  have  ensured  a  sustained  misallocation  of  resources  in  the production  and
consumption of sweeteners worldwide, not only imnosing high costs on their own economies but
those of efficient exporting countries as well.
4.  PROSPECTS  FOR  CHANGE
As reviewed earlier, cyclical price booms and slumps have long been a feature of the world sugar
market. Presently,  the market is in the upswing phase of its cycle. Since the large build up in
production in response to the boom of  1980-81,  regular growth in consumption  has outpaced
growth in production and stocks have been run down. World prices are not yet high enough to
induce significant policy changes which would allow for significant increases in the production of
sugar. With regular growth in demand likely to continue, however, importers will most likely be
forced to bid up prices further over the next two or three seasons.
Exactly how high prices rise will depend importantly on random factors such as the weather. With
stocks presently very low the market is especially sensitive to information about crop losses in any
of the major producing regions. Taking into account the probability of below average crops in
coming seasons and the present phase of the price cycle, the World Bank  assesses that there is at
least a 30 per cent chance of prices being above US20c/lb in each year between 1991 and 1993. As a
rough rule of thumb, prices above 20c/lb can be regarded as boom prices. The tighter the stock
situation becomes without inducing a significant price response, the longer the delay in an eventual
supply response, and the greater is the probability that very high prices will be required to ration
imports during a period of physical shortages.
Without significant policy reforms, boom prices, as in the past, are likely to set in motion political
processes in many countries of the type reviewed earlier in this paper. Ultimately, boom prices are
likely to act as a trigger to synchronise changes in policies which lead to expansion of sweetener
production capacity in many countries, including high-cost producing countries. Worldwide, a large
build up in production in excess of consumption, such as has occurred after previous booms, is
likely.  The continuing  protection  of enlarged  industries  around the world  will cause  another
sustained period of depressed prices; and sugar will continue to be produced with more resources
than is necessary globally.
Policy  Reform
Agricultural trade reforms are presently under discussion in the 'Uruguay round' of inultilateral trade
negotiations taking place through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Contracting parties to
the Uruguay round  have agreed that there is an  urgent need to overcome  the policy  induced
distortions of agricultural trade. The most ambitious targets established were those of the United
States and the Cairns Group. Both, in their opening position statements, called for multilateral
elimination of protectionist agricultural policies within ten years. The position statements of other
participant groups, including that of the European Community, all called for less restraint on the
operation  of  market  forces  in  agricultural  markets.  Complete  free trade,  however,  was  not
considered a feasible option.
Following  trilateral  talks between the United States, the European Community  and  the Cairns
Group, agreement was finally reached in April 1989  on a framework for negotiations on agricultural
reform during the balance of the Uruguay round. The agreement encompassed both short-term and
long-term reform measures. In the short term, participants in the Uruguay round have agreed to
freeze agricultural support at current levels; they have also committed themselves to reducing support
and protection  levels  in  1990. For the longer term, participants  have agreed on a negotiating
framework designed to provide for substantial progressive reductions in agricultural support and
protection over an agreed time period, in order to help overcome restrictions and distortions in world
agricultural markets. Of course, while this agreement on a negotiating framework is encouraging, it1 9
remains  to be seen whether  the major agricultural  trading  blocks  have the political  will to act upon
their  proposals  and to deliver  major  trade  reforms.
The factors  which  may contribute  to the introduction  of reform  in the sugar  trading  system  include
the following:
If reform  is multilateral,  this can significantly  ease the burden  of adjustmemt  to freer  trade for
individual  countries.  Under  multilateral  reform:
- the chances of long periods of depressed world prices would be reduced to a much
greater  extent  than  could  be achieved  by one or two  countries  or economies;
- the world price would be less variable,  reducing  the average  costs to government  and
consumers  of agricultural  support programs,  and also reducing  the costs imposed by
price risk.
The growing  public  awareness  of the costs of current  policies,  including  the cost of ignoring
the benefits  of freer  trade, may  in some  countries  act to change  the political  balance  in favor  of
reform.
The following  factors,  however,  are working  against  reform.
In many  countries,  specific  groups  with vested  interests  - especially  highly  protected  producer
groups  -have sufficient  influence  so that overt  reductions  in protection  through  specitic  policy
changes  will not be achieved  easily.  Indirect  means  of achieving  reductions  in protection  and
intervention  may  be more  likely  to succeed  than  policy  changes  perceived  to pose  a direct  threat
to the incomes  of specific  groups.
Multilateral,  multicommodity  negotiations  involve a large number  of groups. the larger the
number  of groups  the more  difficult  it is to obtain  agreement.
*  The presently  rising world price may reduce the concern of producing  countries  about the
adverse  effects  of the current trading  system,  and thus reduce  interest  in lowering  the support
levels  to producers  in high protection  countries.
Specific  Reforms  in  Particular  Countries
Theoretical  and empirical  evidence  shows  that with a move  away  from  interventionist  trade  policies,
the welfare  of exporting  and importing  countnes alike would  increase  - alternative  policies  result in
losses in efficiency  through  the process  of redistributing  income to sugar and and other sweetener
producers.  Nonetheless,  because  of vested interests  a move  to free trade may  be difficult  to achieve
due to political  pressures  from these  groups.  Still, other  policy  reforms  may  provide  some  scope  for
major improvements  in efficiency  and  welfare.
a. United  States
Sturgiss,  Field and Young  (1990)  argue  that various support  policies  which  are trade-neutral  (such
as direct  payments)  could  be adopted  in the United  States  which  would  be considerably  less  costly  to
the US economy and US consumers  over the next  five years  than  a continuation  of existing  policies.
Such policies  would also practically  eliminate  the costs of US policy on other countries,  since a
trade-neutral  policy  would  not decrease the world  price.  Conflicts  between  US domestic  and  foreign
objectives  would  then be resolved.  Support  policies  which are trade-neutral  in their effect provide
assistance  to targeted  producers through  direct income  payments  from government  while leaving
consumption,  production  and trade  outcomes  unchanged.  The US delegation  to GATT  has proposed20
that achieving  trade-neutral  policies  using direct income  payments  be a goal  for all countries  in the
GATT  round.
In table 6, eight alternative  policy  options  for the United  States which were evaluated  by Sturgiss,
Field and Young  (1990)  are listed.  In table 7 the income  transfers  and the impact  on the world  price
arising  from the alternative  policies  are given. After  evaluating  this  range of options,  Sturgiss,  Field
and Young  (1990)  conclude  that,  to reduce  the costs  of US policies,  the goals of any reform  should
include  making  payment  of assistance  to producers  direct  and visible  and that  prices  facing  US sugar
and sweetener  producers  and consumers  should  be exposed  to world  prices as much  as possible.
6 Summary  of simulated  policy  reforms  in Sturgiss,  Field  and Young  (1990)
Simulation Producer  price  Method  of assistance  Consumer  price  Trade
Base  Maintained  US  market  price  Producer  price  Import  quota
la  Receive  world  price  No assistance  World  price  Free  trade
lb  Maintained  Direct  income  World  price  Free  trade
payments
2  Maintairt4  Deficiency  payment  World  price  Free  trade
3  Target  price  reduced  Deficiency  payment  World  price  Free  trade
by 10% 1990,  further
10%  over 4 years
4  Target  price  reduced  Deficiency  payment  World  price  plus  10%  ad
by 10% 1990,  further  10%  ad valorem  valorem  tariff
10%  over 4 years  tariff
5  Target  price  reduced  Deficiency  payment  World  price  plus  10% tariff
by 10% 1990  10%  ad valorem  Similar  changes
tariff  to EC and  Japan
prices
6  Loan  rate  reduced  by  US market  price  Producer  ')rice  Import  quota
US6c/lb  (nominal)
over 4 years
The Sturgiss,  Field  and Young  (1990)  study  concludes  with two  major observations:
'The  coincidence  of the timing  of the Uruguay  round,  (the findings  of a recent  GATT  panel  on
the inconsistency  of current  US sugar import  quotas),  and the forthcoming  1990  farm  bill may
provide an impetus for US reform that was missing  from the farmn  bill debates in 1981 and
1985,  and a unique  opportunity  both for reform  of the US sugar  program  and  participation  by
the United  States  in wider  ranging  multilateral  reforms.'2 1
'There  is a danger  that US policies,  if not reformed  unilaterally  or as part of multilateral  trade
negotiations,  could follow  the path  taken earlier  by EC sugar  policies.  The United  States,  with
the development  of new  com and chemically  based  sweeteners,  could  become  a large  exporter
of subsidised  sweete,iers.  This would  raise the costs of the program and would also create a
new set of unintended  beneficiaries  with  a stake  in seeing  policies  maintained.  The tendency  to
perpetuate  current  inefficient  policies  would  thus  be increased.'
7  Change  in world price,  income  transfers  and costs  to US groups  resulting  from alternative
policies,  annual  averages  for the period 1991-95  a In 1988  values
change  in  US  US sugar  US fructose  US  Net cost to
Simulation  b  world  price  consumers  producers  producers  economy  government
%  US$m  US$m  US$m  US$m  US$m
Simulation  la  3.8  942  -364  -417  167  11
Simulation  lb  3.8  942  0  -417  167  375
Simulation  2  0.6  1 108  -2  -490  187  445
Simulation  3  2.2  1  025  -211  -454  175  196
Simulation  4  0.8  583  -94  -259  92  61
Simulation  5  15.4  349  -63  -155  37  90
Simulation  6  1.8  528  -207  -233  83  -1
a Transfers and costs may no, cancel due to the exclusion of stockholders and to rounding. b simulation la  Free trade between
United States and the rest of the world.  lb: Trade neutraL direct income payments, assistance to sugar producers maintained in
real terms. 2: Deficiency payments, assistance to sugar producers maintained in real terms. 3: Deficiency payments,
assistance to sugar producers reduced. 4: Deficiency payments, assistance to sugar producers reduced. to ad valorem tariff of 10
per cent. 5: Simulation 4 applied to the European Community and Japan. 6: Bradley plan.
Source: Sturgiss. Field and Young (1990).
b. Japan
Many of the benefits from Japan moving  to free trade could be achieved by reducing consumer
prices  and making  them  more  responsive  to world  prices.  Protection  to producers  could  be continued
through the use of well targeted  direct payments  from government.  Sturgiss,  Tobler and Connell
(1988) conclude that direct income supplements  to farners would'provide a more efficient and
equitable  means  of assistance  than is currently  provided  under  unit subsidies.Targeting  assistance  to
to help inefficient  farmers leave the industry or by providing incentives  to establish alternative
industries  may be more efficient  ways of providing  support  to various regions than by distorting
prices.
In 1988,  Japan introduced  a number  of reforms  to its agricultural  sector.  Forces  from within  Japan
as well as pressure  from the United  States  may have  precip-ated these  changes.  While  this may  be
an indication  of a desire by the Japanese  to reduce  intervention  affecting  some  agricultural  products,
reforms to the sugar industry  may be of lower priority.  To date the reforms  have mostly  affected
products  exported  by the United  States.
As in the United  States,  failure  to reform  the sugar  industry  could lead  to the establishment  of larger
groups with a stake in retaining  existing supports.  The further  technical  development  and market
penetration  of alternative sweeteners  would  ultimately  increase the proportion  of the sweeteners
market  being  met from subsidised  domestic  sources.22
c .The European Community
Because the EC sugar  regime is largely  self-financing  and thereby  does  not impose  excessive  costs
on the Community  budget,  it is regarded  within the Community  as being  one of the less  problematic
aspects  of the Common  Agricultural  Policy.  Nonetheless,  subsidies  dtrived from price  support  have
made up over half of the revenue  received  by producers  of A and B quota sugar  in recent years  and
high consumer  prices have  caused  consumption  to be lower than  otherwise.  As long as EC policy
encourages the sugar industry to use resources up to a point where their cost exceeds the
international  value  of sugar,  the policy  will impose  a large  cost on the EC economy.
Policy reforms which expose consumers  to world prices and which limit or reduce subsidised
production  through  the use of quotas  will provide  benefits  to the EC as well as to exporters  to the
world market.  In the past the EC has expanded  quotas and or prices  following  booms  in the world
price. If prices boom some time in the next few seasons,  pressures  may arise again to raise these
support  mechanisms.  For instance,  if East  Germany  is absorbed  into the EC, a period of high world
prices may provide the impetus and apparent political justification to raise quotas in a United
Germany.  Ensuring  current production  quota limits and/or subsidised  prices are not increased in
response to high world prices may be an impornant  policy challenge  in ehe 1990s.  Any reforms
which  achieve  a reduction  in production  quota  levels  would  represent  a major  increase  in efficiency.
8 Net  benefits  to ACP countries  from EC policies,  US$m 1984
1990  1992  1994  1996  1998  2000  2002  Total  Annual
(90-02)  average
Barbados  4  2  -7  5  0  3  -10  -9  -1
Belize  2  0  -8  2  -3  0  -12  -37  -3
Conao  1  0  -2  1  0  0  -2  -5  0
Cote  d'Ivoire  1  1  - 1  1  1  -1  6  0
Fiji  7  -2  -36  5  -20  -4  -58  -216  -17
Guyana  16  10  -19  21  7  16  -22  46  4
Jamaica  12  8  -14  15  5  12  -17  30  2
Madagascar  1  0  -2  1  0  0  -3  -6  0
Malawi  -1  -3  -8  -3  -8  -4  -14  -77  -6
Mauritius  40  20  -74  49  -4  29  -102  -116  -9
St Christopher  Nevis  1  1  -2  1  0  1  -3  -4  0
Swaziland  1  -7  -32  -3  -25  -11  -56  -259  -20
Tanzania  1  1  -1  1  0  1  -2  1  0
Trinidad  and  Tobago  5  3  -5  6  3  5  -5  18  1
Zimbabwe  -2  -4  -11  -4  -11  -6  -20  -111  -9
Continuation  of existing  EC policy  has the potential  to not only impose  high costs  on the Community
itself, but also on many exporters,  including some ACP exporters  and the world economy  more
generally.  As the exports from efficient  ACP exporters  grow through  time, their ACP quota access
to the high-priced EC market will decline as a proportion of total exports. The world price
depressing  effects  of the EC policy  could  then tend  to outweigh  the benefits  deriving  from the quota
sales to the EC itself. In table 8, estimated average annual welfare benefits, total benefits, and
benefits  from select years,  arising  from EC policy  for most ACP countries  over the period 1990  to
2002 are presented.  The growth  in production  simulated  in the rest of the world sector  of the model
of Wong, Sturgiss  and Borrell (1989) has been assumed  to apply to all ACP countries, since the
ACP countries  are not included  as a separate  group in the model.  The price-depressing  effect  of EC
policy  is estimated  using the model  of Wong,  Sturgiss  and Borrell  (1989)  as the difference  between:23
simulated prices assuming a continuation of EC policy processes, and simulated prices assuming A
and B quota production is restricted to EC consumption only. Towards the end of the period the
majority of countries are estimated to receive negative net benefits from the policy - assuming no
increase in import quota to the ACP countries.
d. The Cairns Group
The interests of specific groups around the world involved in the sugar market are many and varied.
In many cases, opposing interests are not balanced through the political process because they are
separated by rational borders. Probably the main channel through which one national interest group
can influence policies in another country is through its effect on the world price. The results of the
study by Wong, Sturgiss and Borrell (1989) suggest that world price - and particularly its variability
- has the potential to modify incendives  governing policy formation in several countries.
After evaluating  a number of different multilateral reform options, Wong,  Sturgiss and Borrell
(1989) conclude that, for greatest effectiveness, trade reform should expose both consumers and
producers of marginal output to the world price. Simply reducing support prices can, to a small
extent and in the short term, reduce the drop in world price during trough periods, but would not
significantly reduce instability. Indeed, it could slightly intensify price peaks, which lead producers
to lobby for changes which encourage production.
To  achieve durable  reforms,  Wong, Sturgiss and Borrell  (1989) argue that measures must  be
adopted that alter the incentives which affect the policy formation process. This will require changing
the world price cycle so as to remove much of the price variability (perhaps, as a side-effect, even
altering the period of the cycle). To do this, marginal production, at least, should be exposed to the
world price. This already occurs in the European Community. Sugar produced for A and B quotas,
which accounts for most of the EC crop, is heavily supported. Sugar produced in the C category,
however, is largely unsupported and usually receives only the world price. This C production is
quite responsive to the world price, as is shown by the decline of total EC production by over 2 Mt
from  its  1982 peak.  If  sugar  producing  countries  around  the world  adopted  similar  po.icy
instruments to the C category element of the EC policies, it could be expected that produntion
responses to world price would occur which would tend to stabilise the price.
In a growing market like that for sugar it may be possible to make producers in several lower cost
countries more responsive  to the world price without imposing significant adjustment costs on
producers, consumers or taxpayers in those countries. The world sugar market is expanding by
around 2 per cent each year, despite inroads  being made into it by some (generally protected)
alternative sweeteners (Borrell, Wong and Sturgiss 1989). World production must increase in some
fashion to meet this increased demand. If lower cost producers were not constrained  by supply
control policies, they would respond more rapidly to rising world prices by producing extra sugar.
In  the past  they have  collectively  responded  some  time  after  each  world price  peak.  In  an
unconstrained situation producers would have an incentive to anticipate growth in demand and to
match their expansion more closely to emerging market opportunities than is possible at present.
Smaller, gradual increases in production would then be likely, rather than the large, widely separated
jumps in production which have occurred in the past. If oversupply occurred and world price fell,
marginal production would contract, so that long periods of low world price would become less
likely.
In a rising world mark-', producers in low-cost exporting countries have an incentive to support -
either unilaterally or multilaterally -policy changes which would allow them to respond directly to
the world price. Multilaterally,  a group of countries may be able to influence  substantially the
variability of world price. The results reported by Wong, Sturgiss and Borrell (1989) suggest that a
small amount of price-responsive production can substantially stabilise the world price. Intervention
currently applying to existing volumes of sugar should be strictly limited to that output, and where
possible reduced.24
The Cairns Group consists of Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Fiji, Hungary,
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, New Zealand, Thailand and Uruguay. The sugar exporters of
this group constitute the majority of the world's low-cost producers. Collectively, this group has the
potential to reduce the volatility of world price (see reference to figure F). To do this, they would
have to implement  policy changes which  would leave their producers  free to make their own
marginal production decisions in light of expected world prices.
The Cairns Group exporters have a common interest in reducing price volatility and in supplying
more sugar to the growing world market. In a buoyant market such as is likely to prevail over the
next few seasons, concerted action by members of this group may improve the trading environment
of each  member.  Currently production  in these countries  is highly regulated although  lightly
protected.
As pointed out by Wong, Sturgiss and Borrell (1989), a Cairns Group initiative designed to prevent
boom prices on the world matket could be undertaken by low-protection nations independently of
the reform problems of high-protection nations. Such an initiative would be consistent with the
Cairns Group's first aim: that is, it would head off a buildup in protection by removing the incentive
for new demands by vested interests in higher-cost countries. At the same time, such an initiative is
not likely to jeopardise other moves by the group toward a more open trading systemn  Indeed, it may
strengthen the position of the group. By reducing the probability of low prices it would lessen the
perceived  need  for  policies  sue'  as those  operated  in  the United  States  and  the European
Community. The more substantial and widespread the reforrns undertaken, and the greater the
proportions of production and consumption that are exposed to world price, the less variable the
price will become. Despite the incentives for low cost countries to free up their markets, political
constraints remain which make such countries cautious to change
Of the Cairns group members, Australia and Brazil are the two countries with the greatest potential
to influence world price variability if reforms are introduced. While there has been some relaxation
of production controls in Australia in recent times, they have been small only and controls still
greatly restrict the responsiveness of Australian supply. And in Brazil, in the past two years instead
of increasing  sugar production,  sugar quotas  have been reduced to allow for the expansion of
ethanol  output. Although  pressure  has been exerted  by  Brazilian producers  for  relaxation  of
production controls on sugar, it has not yet resulted in any significant liberalisation.
Best Bet  Scenario
Without concerted action by low-cost exporting countries to immediately reform their policies in
ways which allow their producers  to respond directly to world prices, supply shortfalls and an
eighteen month to two year price boom are likely to occur sometime before 1995. The atizi.tion given
to the disruptive policies of the United States, the European Community and Japan in recent years
and agreements already reached through GAiT,  may create enough pressure to hold absolute levels
of support in check in these countries over the 1990's - the prospects for durable and worthwhile
reform of these policies however, remains very much in doubt given the vested interests already
established.  Nonetheless  any reforms  in these countries  which  increase the exposure  of their
producers and/or consumers to the world price would allow for significant benefits from trade to be
achieved.
Even if protection in highly supported OECD countries is held in check, without policy reform in
OECD or Cairns group nations to alter and substantially reduce the amplitude of the sugar price
cycle, the prospects for an increase in production of highly subsidised sweeteners in other parts of
the world seems to be a clear possibility. In particular, the Soviet Union, other parts of Eastern
Europe, China and India, may increase production in response to booming world prices. China and
the Soviet Union  for instance,  with their very  large imports, are countries which may seek to
diversify  their supplies  of sweeteners if the world price booms and greatly raises  the foreign
exchange costs of sugar. Sharp expansions in corn syrup production occurred in the United States
and Japan following the price peaks of 1974-75 and 1980-81. In the United States and Japan use of25
high fructose  corn syrup  has reached  saturation  levels.  High  world prices  in the world market  may,
for instance,  give high fructose  corn syrup companies  in the United  States and Japan an incentive
and perceived  justification  f; r engagiig in joint ventures  to establish  and run plants in the Soviet
Union and China. It  is  possible such joint  ventures could be negotiated based on some
understanding  about price stability in the domestic  market.  Ultimately  such developments  would
displace imports. Along with other increases in sweetener supplies coining from other regions
following  a boom, the world price could become  highly  depressed  again in the second half of the
1990s.
References
Anderson,  K. and Tyers,  R. (1986),  'Agricultural  policies  of industrial  countries  and their effects
on traditional  food exporters',  Economic  Record  179  (December),  385-99.
ABARE  (Australian  Bureau  of Agricultural  -nd Resource  Economics)  (1988),  Japanese
Agricultural  Policies,  Policy  Monograph  No. 3, AGPS,  Canberra.
BAE  (Bureau  of Agricultural  Economics)  (1985),  Agricultural  Policies  in the  European
Commnunity:  Their  Origins,  Nature  and  Effects  on Production  and  Trade,  Policy  Monograph
No.2, AGPS, Canberra.
Ballinger,  R.A. (1971),  A History  of Sugar  Marketing,  Agricultural  Economic  Report  No.197,
Economnic  Research  Service,  US Department  of Agriculture,  Washington  DC.
Borrell,  B. and Wong,  G. (1986),  Efficiency  of Transport,  Milling  and  Handling  in the Sugar
Industry,  BAE  Occassional  Paper  No. 96, AGPS,  Canberra.
-,  Sturgiss,  R. and Wong,  G. (1987):  Global  Effects  of the US Sugar Policy,  BAE
Discussion  Paper No.87.3,  AGPS,  Canberra.
-,  Wong,  G. and Sturgiss,  R. (1989),  Growth  in world sugar consumption.  ABARE  paper
presented  at the National  Agricultural  Outlook  Conference,  Canberra,  17-19  January.
Commission  of the European  Communities  (1988),  The  Agricultural  Situation  in the
Community:  1988  Report, Brussels (and previous  issues).  -
Connell,  P. (March 1989), "Effects  of the new  domestic  sugar  marketing  arrangement",
Agricultural  and  Resources  Quarterly, 1(1),  59-70,  AGPA,  Canberra.
Fry, J. (1982), 'The costs of production  of sugar and HCFS',  in F.O. Licht 1982 Yearbook,
Ratzeburg,  Federal  Republic  of Germany.
Ives, R. and Hurley,  J.  for the United States Department  of  Commerce. International  Trade
Division.  United  States  Sugar  Policy:  an Analysis, Washington  D.C.,  U.S. Government
Printing  Office, 1988.
Kindleberger,  C.P., (1973),  International  Economics,  Richard  D. Irwin,  Homewood  Illinois.26
Koestler, U., and Schmitz. (1982) 'The EC sugar market policy and developing countries',
European Review of Agricultural Economics 9.
Olsen, M. (1982) The Rise and Decline of Nations, Yale University Press, USA.
Rendleman, M., and Hertel, T.W. (1989), Economy-wide effects of the sugar program, Selected
paper, American Agricultural Economics Association,  August, Baton Rouge, Louisiana.
Sturgiss, R., Tobler, P., and Connell, P. (1988), Japanese Sugar Policy and its Effects on
World Markets, ABARE Occasional Paper No.104, AGPS, Canberra.
_  Connell., and Tobler. (1990), 'Australia's influence on world sugar prices', Agricultural and
Resources Quarterly,  2(1), 47-55, AGPS Canberra.
_,  Field, H. and Young, L. (1990), 1990 and US Sugar Policy Reform, ABARE Discussion
Paper No. 90.4., AGPS Canberra.
Sudaryanto, T. (1987), 'The potential impacts of liberalised trade policies in the Unites States and
the European Economic Community in international markets for sugar', PhD thesis, Graduate
Faculty of North Carolina State University. Raleigh.
Valdes, A., and Zietz, J. (1980), Agricultural Protection in OECD Countries: Its Costs to Less-
Developed Countries, Research Report 21, Washington, D.C., International Food Policy
Research Institute.
Webb, A.T., Roningen, V.0. and Dixit, P. (1987), 'Analysing agricultural trade liberalisation for
the Pacific Basin'. Paper presented at the Livestock and Feedgrains Working Group of the
Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference, Napier, New Zealand, 20-22 October.
Wong, G., Sturgiss, R. and Borrell, B. (1989), The Economic Consequences of International
Sugar Trade Reform, ABARE Discussion Paper, (1987.7), AGPS Canberra.
Zietz, J., and Valdes, A. (1986), The costs of Protectionism To Developing Countries: An
Analysis  for selected Agricultural Products, World Bank Staff Working Paper 769,
Washington D.C.PRE  Working  Paper  Series
Contact
TIil  AuthorDAQ  for  paper
WPS496  Issues  in Evaluating  Tax and  Robert  Conrad  August 1990  A. Bhalla
Payment  Arrangements  for Publicly  Zmarak  Shalizi  37699
Owned  Minerals  Janet  Syme
WPS497 The  Measurement  of Budgetary  Carlos  Elbirt  August  1990  T. Gean
Operations  in Highly  Distorted  34247
Economies:  The  Case  of Angola
WPS498 The  Build,  Operate,  and  Transfer  Mark  Augenblick  August  1990  D. Schein
('BOT")  Approach  to Infrastructure  B. Scott  Custer,  Jr.  70291
Projects  in Developing  Countries
WPS499  Taxing  Foreign  Income  in Capital-  Chad  Leechor  September  1990  A. Bhalla
Importing  Countries:  Thailand's  Jack M. Mintz  37699
Perspective
WPS500  Projecting  Fertility  for All Countries  Eduard  Bos  September  1990  V. Altfeld
Rodolfo  A. Bulatao  31091
WPS501  Tax  Systems  in  the Reforming  Cheryl  W. Gray  September  1990  L. Lockyear
Socialist  Economies  of Europe  36969
WPS502  Patents  and Pharmaceutical  Drugs:  Julio  Nogues  September  1990  M. T. Sanchez
Understanding  the Pressures  on  33731
Developing  Countries
WPS503  Household  Production,  Time  John  Dagsvik  September  1990  M. Abundo
Allocation,  and  Welfare  in Peru  Rolf  Aaberge  36820
WPS504  Applying  Tax Policy  Models  in  Henrik  Dahl  September  1990  A. Bhalla
Country  Economic  Work:  Pradeep  Mitra  37699
Bangladesh,  China,  and India
WPS505 Creating  the Reform-Resistant  Arye  L.  Hillman  September  1990  CECSE  Staff
Dependent  Economy:  The  CMEA  Adi Schnytzer  37176
International  Trading  Relationship
WPS506 Changes  in Food  Consumption  Merlinda  D. Ingco  September  1990  A. Daruwala
Patterns  in the Republic  of Korea  33713
WPS507 Poverty  in Poland,  Hungary,  and  Branko  Milanovic  September  1990  A. Bretana
Yugoslavia  in the Years  of Crisis,  37176
1978-87
WPS508 A RMSM-X  Model  for  Chile  Luis  Serven  September  1990  S. Jonnakuty
39074
WPS509 The  Childbearing  Family  in  Odile  Frank  September  1990  B. Rosa
Sub-Saharan  Africa: Structure,  33751
Fertility,  and  the FuturePRE  Working  Paper  Series
Contact
IilL  Author  D=  for pape
WPS51  0  Public  Expenditure  Reviews  for  Antoine  Schwartz  October  1990  C. Cristobal
Education:  The Bank's  Experience  Gail Stevenson  33640
WPS511 The Macroeconomic  Underpinnings  Fred  Jaspersen  October  1990  A. Oropesa
of Adjustment  Lending  Karim  Shariff  39075
WPS512 Social  Security  Reform:  The  Capital  Patricio  Arrau  October  1990  S. King-Watson
Accumulation  and Intergenerational  31047
Distribution  Effect
WPS513 The  Business  Cycle  Associated  with  Miguel  A. Kiguel  October  1990  E. Khine
Exchange-Rate-Based  Stabilization  Nissan  Liviatan  39361
WPS514  Restrictive  Labor  Practices  in  Alan  S. Harding  October  1990  A. Joseph
Seaports  33743
WPS515 Stock  Markets  in Developing  Mansoor  Dailami  October  1990  M. Raggambi
Countries:  Key  Issues  and  a  Michael  Atkin  37657
Research  Agenda
WPS516 International  Capital  Mobility  and  the  Jaime  de Melo  October  1990  S.  Fallon
Costs  of U.S. Import  Restraints  David  Roland-Holst  37947
WPS517 Do Wage Distortions  Justify  Jaime  de Melo  October  1990  S. Fallon
Protection  in the U.S.  Auto  and  David  Tarr  37947
Steel Industries?
WPS518 Industrial  Organization  and  Trade  Jaime  de Melo  October  1990  S. Fallon
Liberalization:  Evidence  from Korea  David  Roland-Hoist  37947
WPS519  Taxes,  Outward  Orientation,  and  Irene  Trela  October  1990  A. Bhalla
Growth  Performance  in Korea  John  Whalley  37699
WPS520 Trade  Reform,  Policy  Uncertainty,  Sweder  van Wijnbergen  October  1990  M. Stroude
and  the Current  Account  38831
WPS521  World  Bank  Treatment  of the Social  Helena  Ribe  October  1990  M.  Abiera
Impact  of Adjustment  Programs  Soniya  Carvalho  31262
WPS522  A Survey  of the Costs  of  World  Brent  Borrell  October  1990  A. Kitson-Walters
Sugar  Policies  Ronald  C. Duncan  33712
WPS523  EC Bananarama  1992  Brent  Borrell  October  1990  S. Lipscomb
Maw-Cheng  Yang  33718